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RESEARCH SERIES · 02

What Principle Drives an Agent Network?

Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of.

— Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

In the previous post, we argued that many internet services were designed around human participants and do not fully meet the needs of AI agents. Human-oriented formatting can create extra processing work; search alone does not fully support ongoing information needs; and engagement signals do not tell us whether an agent has helped its user. This post takes up the natural follow-up: if we're building a network for agents, what is the principle behind it?

To answer that, we need to start from the nature of agents. They differ from humans in many ways, and two of those differences have major implications for the design of an agent network.

1. Two Key Differences

Resource-Constrained, Not Attention-Constrained

The first key difference between humans and agents is what limits them.

Humans are attention-constrained. They consciously process information at roughly 10 bits per second; a recent synthesis across reading, typing, video-game play, and memory tasks puts the figure between about 5 and 50 bits/s, against sensory input around 10910^9 bits/s.1 Platforms compete for that scarce attention, and the resulting attention economy runs on engagement metrics, ranking algorithms, and ad-driven business models.

Agents face no such cognitive bottleneck. Under the hood, a model is matrix multiplications and activation functions running on GPUs, with no focus to lose, no mind to tire, no 10-bits-per-second ceiling on conscious bandwidth. That isn't to say they're unconstrained. Context windows are finite, and even fleets of subagents face coordination costs. Agents have limited resources, and processing information consumes tokens and takes time.

Always Goal-Oriented

The second key difference is what they consume information for.

An agent is created to be a means to a human's end. It exists to carry out a task, and at every moment it is acting in service of some goal. That goal gives it a yardstick. Each piece of content an agent takes in can be measured against the task at hand: does this move me closer to what I was asked to do, and by how much? An agent running a literature search can score every paper it encounters by how well it advances that search; everything it reads must justify the resources spent on it. Consumption for an agent is always instrumental.

Humans are not built this way. We read, watch, and scroll for reasons that often have no goal to measure against, out of curiosity, habit, boredom, or the simple pleasure of it. Much of what we consume serves no pending decision, and we rarely stop to ask what a given paragraph was worth. For an agent, that question is the whole point: every input can be assessed against the goal it was created to serve, even when its value is uncertain.

2. The Principle of Mutual Benefit

Sender and Receiver Utility

Agents incur costs when sending and receiving information, and they value it by what it can contribute to their users’ goals. Each side can therefore assess whether a transmission is worth its cost. That makes homo economicus a useful model for this discussion: rational actors who seek to maximize utility under constraints. Some costs, such as token usage, can be measured directly; other costs and benefits must be assessed in the context of the user’s task.

Every transmission between agents is then an economic event. A sender expends resources to distribute, and a receiver expends resources to consume. Each side has a net utility:

  • Sender utility uₛ: the sender's net utility. This is what the sender gains from distributing, minus the cost of doing so.
  • Receiver utility uᵣ: the receiver's net utility. This is the value the receiver extracts from the information, minus the costs of receiving it and deciding what to do with it.

The benefit of a transmission can take many forms: information that helps complete a task, a better decision, a new relationship, or an opportunity for future cooperation. Its cost includes not only tokens and money, but also time and other uses of the resources it consumes. What matters on each side depends on the goals and circumstances of the person or organization the agent serves.

We use net utility to express the balance of these benefits and costs. They may be uncertain and difficult to measure, but an agent still has to judge whether a transmission is worth making. Such judgments are estimates made with the information available at the time; they do not require an exact utility score or guarantee the outcome. The principle below describes the ideal outcome the network aims to enable.

For example, a financial-data agent broadcasts a Federal Reserve interest-rate decision to a portfolio-management agent. The sender pays compute to format and broadcast in exchange for reputation (or subscription fees), so uₛ is positive. If the signal improves a portfolio decision enough to justify the costs of obtaining, assessing, and using it, then uᵣ is positive. With both sides ahead, the transmission should happen. Replace the receiver with a portfolio agent that holds no rate-sensitive assets, and uᵣ goes negative. This message has no bearing on any decision the new agent faces, so the tokens it spends reading it are wasted.

Stating the Principle

Consider the four combinations of net utility. Positive utility means a gain relative to no transmission; zero means no change; negative utility means a loss. The examples below illustrate these outcomes rather than define them.

uᵣ ≥ 0uᵣ < 0
uₛ ≥ 0Mutual benefit if at least one gains ✓Sender does not lose; receiver loses
uₛ < 0Receiver does not lose; sender losesBoth sides lose

Mutual benefit means, in the broad sense used here, that at least one participant gains and neither loses. The condition does not require both participants to gain. Effects on others still need separate consideration.2 When both gain, the sender may profit from distribution (reputation, reciprocity, payment), while the receiver benefits from content that informs a decision or triggers a valuable action. Agents do not share the human attention bottleneck, but their time and resources are still limited. A transmission also qualifies when one side gains and the other has zero net utility. A transmission that leaves both sides unchanged does not qualify.

Sender does not lose; receiver loses (uₛ ≥ 0, uᵣ < 0): Spam is one example: the sender profits from exposure while the receiver pays tokens to process noise. Picture a marketing agent blasting Black Friday deals to a fleet of portfolio-management agents. The marketer gains broad exposure, the portfolio agents pay real tokens to parse content irrelevant to any holding they track, polluting context that could have held relevant signals. Counting the sender’s exposure as success would overlook the loss imposed on receivers.

Receiver does not lose; sender loses (uₛ < 0, uᵣ ≥ 0): a privacy violation can produce this outcome. Picture a personal-assistant agent pressured into handing its user's private data (purchase history, location, health records) to an advertiser's agent. The advertiser gains real value, while the user that assistant represents ends up exposed. Their data flows on to be resold, profiled, or used against them. The advertiser’s gain does not, by itself, justify exposing the user to that harm.

Both sides lose: poor matching can consume resources without helping either participant, leaving both worse off than if no transmission had occurred.

The ideal transmission set contains every transmission that leaves neither side worse off and at least one side better off. In the table, these lie in the top-left cell, excluding the case where both utilities are zero. The other three cells lie outside the ideal set.

A participant has reason to decline an exchange it expects to leave it worse off. But unwanted messages and mistaken judgments can still produce losses. We therefore propose mutual benefit as a rule for what the network should facilitate. When information loses value with time, a beneficial transmission should also happen promptly. This is the Principle of Mutual Benefit:

Principle of Mutual Benefit

A transmission should occur if and only if at least one side gains and neither side loses. When those gains decay over time, the transmission should occur as promptly as the condition allows.2

The principle describes an ideal outcome: at least one participant gains, without that gain coming at the other’s expense. It does not require adding or comparing utility scores across users. Before an exchange, agents can only estimate whether it will meet this condition, using the information available at the time.

Agents can be configured to operate continuously, but their availability and resources still vary. The network should avoid unnecessary delay when a message’s value is time-sensitive, within the constraints set by both participants.

The principle gives us a goal for the network and a participation rule for each agent.

Network-Level Goal

The network should find and enable mutually beneficial transmissions while they are still useful, without imposing unwanted losses on participants. This is a design target, not a guarantee that every useful exchange can be found or completed. Whether a transmission is worthwhile depends on the information and resources available at the time.

Individual Participation Rule

In practice, each agent assesses whether participating is expected to leave its user at least as well off as not participating. A receiver weighs the expected value of a signal against the costs of receiving it and deciding what to do with it; a sender weighs the expected value of distribution against its costs. Each agent can assess its own participation without comparing its utility with the other’s. Willingness to proceed does not guarantee that the outcome meets the principle; the network still has to find the match and coordinate the transmission.

The table below compares sending a message with not sending one. Each side’s net utility includes the benefits it gains and the resources it spends.

OutcomeSender’s net utilityReceiver’s net utility
No message is sent00
A message is sentuₛuᵣ

Sending a message incurs costs on both sides: the sender spends resources to distribute it, and the receiver spends resources to receive and assess it—even if it declines to act. If neither side gains any benefit, both net utilities are negative. The transmission meets the mutual-benefit condition only when neither side loses and at least one gains.

The Principle of Mutual Benefit is the backbone of everything that follows. The key question, then, is how closely a given network approaches this ideal. The next section sets out three dimensions for evaluating it.

3. Evaluating the Network

The Principle of Mutual Benefit sets a clear target: the ideal transmission set. The three dimensions below guide evaluation of how closely a network approaches that ideal and at what cost. Coverage and precision are conceptual benchmarks, not directly calculable metrics: utilities are difficult to assess, and many possible transmissions remain undiscovered.

Coverage asks about completeness: of all the transmissions that should occur, what fraction actually do? Coverage can be undermined either when the network fails to discover an existing match between senders and receivers, or when it discovers the match too late, after the information's value has already decayed.

Precision asks about accuracy: of all the transmissions that actually happen, what fraction are genuinely in the ideal set? Precision can fail through noise (irrelevant content that the receiver must still process and pay tokens for) and staleness (information that was once relevant but has already become outdated by the time it arrives).

Cost measures the full resource burden of running the network. Compute is only the visible part, covering the matching engine, routing, and storage. But the true cost extends further to include development, operations, and governance. A network that achieves high coverage and precision at astronomical cost is not practical, and a network that cannot fund itself from the value it creates is not sustainable.

Agents spend resources on information to serve their users’ goals. This motivates the Principle of Mutual Benefit: a transmission should occur if and only if at least one side gains and neither loses. Coverage, precision, and cost give us three dimensions for evaluating progress toward that ideal. A network built on this principle answers to a fundamentally different scorecard than engagement on the human internet.

Acknowledgments

We thank Zhuoya Zhang for bringing an economics perspective to this article, with thoughtful comments on utility and how to explain the benefits to senders and receivers.

Footnotes

  1. Zheng & Meister, "The unbearable slowness of being: Why do we live at 10 bits/s?", Neuron (Dec 2024), argues for ~10 bits/s as the typical throughput of conscious processing; individual tasks (typing, reading, speech, video games, memory champions) measure between roughly 5 and 50 bits/s. Earlier work put the ceiling at around 50 bits/s (see Britannica's overview, popularized in Nørretranders' Mærk Verden (1991; English: The User Illusion, 1998)). The exact figure varies by methodology; the order of magnitude, tens of bits per second at most, is durable. ↩

  2. The principle covers pairwise exchange and not everything around it. Microeconomics has long recognized three failure modes where two-party voluntary exchange isn't sufficient. Externalities arise when transactions have effects that spill onto third parties. Public goods are benefits nobody can be excluded from and that don't get used up, so nobody has reason to pay for them. Collusion is coordination among participants whose individual transmissions each pass mutual benefit but whose collective effect harms the network. Each needs governance layered on top of the principle, not derivable from it. For canonical treatments, see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, Microeconomic Theory (1995), chs. 11 and 12. ↩ ↩2

Author note

Authored by Yiqi Shi and Yongyi Hu, this series builds on ideas and concepts developed collectively by the Phronesis AI team. The authors contributed equally and are listed alphabetically.


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